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Abstract—Preventing the success of active attacks is of essential
importance for network coding since even the infiltration of one
single corrupted data packet can jam large parts of the network.
The existing approaches for network coding schemes preventing
such pollution attacks can be divided into two categories:
utilize cryptographic approaches or utilize redundancy similar
to error correction coding. Within this paper, we compared
both paradigms concerning efficiency of data transmission under
various circumstances. Particularly, we considered an attacker
of a certain strength as well as the influence of the generation
size. The results are helpful for selecting a suitable approach
for network coding taking into account both security against
pollution attacks and efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network Coding introduced by Ahlswede et al. [1] is an
opportunity to achieve the min-cut-max-flow of a network
(multicast capacity) in a multicast scenario. To reach this
multicast capacity, intermediate nodes do not solely forward
data packets but compute and forward algebraic combinations
of these packets.
However, combining packets enables attackers to jam large
parts of the network by infiltrating only one so-called polluted
packet. A polluted packet does not belong to the linear span
of the valid data packets. The problem is the propagation of
corrupted packets to all subsequent nodes which might prevent
successful decoding at the receiving nodes. Thus, there exist
various network coding schemes which aim at limiting the
impact of an active attacker. In the following, we refer to these
schemes as Secure Network Coding (SNC) schemes.
Most SNC schemes we recently analyzed utilize cryp-
tographic approaches such as homomorphic signatures [2],
homomorphic Message Authentication Codes (MACs) [3],
homomorphic hashes [4], or checksums [5]. They all have in
common that intermediate nodes are able to check the validity
of incoming packets. If the validation of a packet fails, it
is discarded; otherwise, it can be included when computing
the combined outgoing packets. Hence, approaches based
on cryptography require that intermediate nodes know keys,
hashes, or checksums, and that they can handle the increased
requirements on computing power, time, and memory.
Intermediate nodes might not be able to fulfill such in-
creased requirements in every scenario. Network error cor-
rection, introduced in [6], works similar to classical coding
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theory and does not require the intermediate nodes to perform
additional tasks. Achieving security against active attackers by
utilizing coding theory was studied, e.g., in [7], [8]. In these
schemes, intermediate nodes cannot check the validity of data
packets they receive, they only need to combine these packets.
Thus, a polluted packet will influence all subsequent paths to
the receivers. The key idea is that the receivers can interpret the
initial polluted packet as an extra packet. The other corrupted
data packets are linear combination of valid packets and the
extra packet. With the help of some redundancy, it is possible
to recover the original data.
Within this paper, we compare SNC schemes based on
cryptography (CryptoSNC) and SNC schemes based on intro-
ducing redundancy (CodingSNC) concerning the efficiency of
data transmission under various circumstances. We particularly
focus on the rateless scenario that does not require knowledge
about the network topology or the attacker strength. On the
one hand, we consider active attackers of a certain strength; on
the other hand, we analyze the influence of the generation size
for the different approaches. We present experimental results
for these scenarios that help in selecting a suitable approach
and parameters for network coding taking into account both
security against pollution attacks and efficiency.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe
the network topology, the attacker model, and give an overview
on different SNC schemes. Section III illustrates the simulation
environment and efficiency metrics; in Section IV, we present
the results of our experiments. Section V concludes and gives
an outlook on further research.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Topology and Attacker Model
The network topology can be described by a directed graph
G = (V,E) with nodes (vertices) V and edges E. An edge e =
(a, b), e ∈ E, a, b ∈ V implies that node a can send packets to
node b. The set of sending (source) nodes S, forwarding (relay)
nodes F and receiving (sink) nodes R is a partition of V. To
simplify matters, we assume exactly one sender (|S| = 1) and
unit capacity on each edge.
Within this paper, we use a network model which is
parametrized in breadth (number of receiving nodes |R|) and
in depth (number of hops k from sender s to receivers R). The
basic network graph consists of k levels of ` nodes, where each
node on one level is connected to each node on the subsequent
level. Thus, the number of outgoing links η of each forwarding
node is equal to `.
This basic network graph where each level is fully con-
nected (η = `) to the next level can be restricted in addition.
We can limit η to decrease the number of send operations in
the network. To stay balanced, we require that the number of
outgoing links of each forwarding node on level κ equals the
number of incoming links of each node on level κ+1. Fig. 1
presents an example for η = 2 and k = 3. Forwarding nodes
with one incoming edge only forward the data packets they
receive; only forwarders with more than one incoming edge
actually perform network coding.
s
f1,1 f1,2 ... f1,`−1 f1,`
f2,1 f2,2 ... f2,`−1 f2,`
r1 r2 ... r`−1 r`
Fig. 1. Network graph with η = 2 and k = 3.
Since we focus on schemes preventing the success of pol-
lution attacks, we consider only active attackers. The attacker
can be described by the number of links |E′| or nodes |V′|
he controls and by his computational power. Basically, we
can distinguish two types of active attackers: Outsiders who
can only jam links E′ ⊂ E and insiders who can control
nodes V′ ⊂ V and, hence, can control all outgoing links
of these corrupted nodes. Within our first experiments, we
focused on outsiders. Thereby, an outsider was simulated by
a probability p which determine whether a link e ∈ E is
corrupted. Additionally, we assume that an attacker cannot
control the outgoing links of the sender since such an attack
has the same influence for both CodingSNC and CryptoSNC.
B. CodingSNC vs. CryptoSNC
Jaggi et al. have shown in [7] that the impact of a limited
attacker who controls z links in a network with multicast
capacity C can be limited to the optimal rate C − z. In case
of a computationally unbounded attacker, a secret channel is
needed in order to reach this optimal rate [8].
An implementation of CodingSNC is introduced in [7]. The
data to be transmitted is represented by a matrix X = [IM ]
that consists of h packets of n bytes each; I is an identity
matrix and M the actual message. The secret necessary to
decode even in case of a polluted packet is an n × C parity
check matrix P . Based on this parity check matrix, a hash
matrix H = XP of size h × C is computed. A possibility
for choosing the hash matrix H independently from X is
introduced in [8]. In that algorithm, X is expanded with a
“modification matrix” L to satisfy H =XP = [IML]P .
The forwarding nodes f ∈ F apply usual random lin-
ear network coding. They receive l data packets xi =
(xi,1, xi,2, ..., xi,n), xi,j ∈ Fq , select l random coefficients
αi ∈ Fq , and compute linear combined packets y for each
outgoing link
y =
l∑
i=1
αixi. (1)
Only the receivers R need the secret. Each of them computes
S = Y P − TˆH , where S is the syndrome matrix, Y is
the matrix of received packets and Tˆ represents the network
transformation, i.e., Tˆ corresponds to the I in the original data
matrix X .
If S is an all-zero matrix, i.e., the rank rk(S) = 0,
there is (with high probability) no corrupted packet in Y .
In case of rk(S) > 0, there are rk(S) corrupted packets.
For multicast capacity C and only C − z independent data
packets in X , there are z redundant packets. Thus, the receiver
can deduct up to z corrupted packets from Y which means
that he can successfully decode all payload data as long as
rk(S) ≤ z. Since a polluted data packet cannot be discarded
by forwarders, it is included in the subsequent processing.
However, linear combinations that contain the polluted data
packet do not further increase rk(S).
The detection of polluted packets works differently for
CryptoSNC. In contrast to CodingSNC, forwarding nodes F
are in most cases also able to check the validity of received
data packets by means of some secret information. Hence, they
can discard corrupted packets and use only valid packets for
computing linear combinations according to (1).
Consequently, a polluted packet influences decodability only
if it decreases the overall multicast capacity C. For example,
this would be the case if the attacker controls a direct link to
a receiver. To ensure decodability independent of the position
of the attacker, we also need redundant data packets. Similar
to CodingSNC, we limit the payload packets to h = C − z
and add z redundant packets which actually are linear combi-
nations of the payload packets. Hence, we can guarantee the
decodability of Y for up to z corrupted packets.
C. Predetermined Redundancy vs. RatelessSNC
We assume an implementation for network coding according
to Practical Network Coding [9], i.e., data to be sent is
organized in generations of size h×n symbols, and each packet
contains a global encoding vector (GEV) of h symbols. Thus,
each generation contains h linear independent data packets.
Basically, the generation size h can be set to the multicast
capacity C since this is the maximum number of data packets
that can be transferred to the recipients in one transmission
round. Lowering the generation size h is equivalent to ex-
plicitly consider z redundant packets per transmission round.
We assume that retransmission of the whole generation is
necessary if decoding was not possible at all recipients. Since
CodingSNC is targeted to an attacker of a given strength,
CryptoSNC is likely to provide better results in this scenario.
In practice, it is not realistic to assume knowledge about
the network topology and the attacker strength. For operating
without such knowledge, rateless coding was applied for
network coding. The sender sends data packets from the
current generation until he gets an acknowledgment from
the recipients which implies that they store data packets of
one generation (e.g. [10], [11]). Recently, the application of
CodingSNC in the rateless scenario was also introduced [12].
The rateless approach is advantageous in case of errors –
since there is no need to resend the whole generation, the
sending overhead decreases. However, the latencies increase.
In the rateless scenario, the analyzed approaches are referred
to as CryptoRSNC and CodingRSNC, respectively.
III. EVALUATION
A. Simulation of the Approaches
For the evaluation of the different approaches, we simulated
CodingSNC, CryptoSNC, CodingRSNC, and CryptoRSNC
using Sage [13] without implementing complete algorithms.
Rather, we focused on the question whether successful decod-
ing at the receiving nodes is possible for a given scenario.
Simulation of CodingSNC means that receiving nodes com-
pute the syndrome matrix S and rk(S). Decoding the matrix
of received packets Y is possible only if rk(Y )− rk(S) = h
after one transmission round, or in other words, if rk(S) ≤ z.
Simulating CryptoSNC means that forwarding and receiving
nodes detect and discard polluted data packets. Hence, the
matrix of received data packets Y contains only valid data
packets. Successful decoding is possible for the receiving
nodes if rk(Y ) = h after one transmission round.
In case of the rateless scenario, the matrix of received data
packets Y is filled over a number of transmission rounds.
Decoding is possible if h linear independent data packets have
been received. Again, intermediate nodes filter out polluted
data packets only in case of CryptoRSNC. For CodingRSNC,
decoding is possible if rk(Y ) − rk(S) = h i.e., the number
of linear independent packets minus the number of corrupted
packets should match the generation size.
Parameters for all simulation runs are the network topology
based on the model introduced in Sec. II, the generation size h,
and the number of redundant packets z. The network topology,
defined by k, `, and η, determines the multicast capacity C that
represents the maximum of h for CodingSNC and CryptoSNC.
Since we assume a random attacker model, the results
are influenced by this random value, we have to repeat the
simulation runs for each scenario multiple times and average
the computed efficiency parameters to get meaningful results.
B. Efficiency Metrics
There are various possibilities to measure efficiency depend-
ing on the application. Within our experiments, we focused on
the question whether all intended recipients can decode all data
packets sent. As a measure, we computed the transmission
efficiency that is generally the ratio of data sent by the
sender to the sum of decodable data of successful transmission
round(s). There are different possibilities for defining the data
sent by the sender which implies different efficiency metrics.
First, we evaluate the efficiency of data transmission refer-
ring to data packets. In one transmission round, the sender
sends data packets over all outgoing edges (s, f1,i) for i =
1, 2, ..., `.
Let in(v) be a function that delivers the matrix of all (valid)
input packets for node v ∈ V, |out(v)| the number of all output
packets of v ∈ V, and dec(Y ) be a function such that
dec(Y ) =
{
h, if rk(Y ) = h
0, otherwise . (2)
We consider a transmission round to be successful only if all
receivers r ∈ R can decode. Hence, we can define the packet
transmission efficiency Ep by
Ep =
minr∈R dec(in(r)) · |R|
|out(s)| . (3)
As an example, consider a network with η = ` = 4. If s
sends h = C = 4 packets and only 3 of the 4 receivers can
decode, minr∈R dec(in(r)) = 0, hence, Ep = 0. If all receivers
can decode, Ep = 4·44 = 4 =̂ 400%. That means, in case of
a successful multicast transmission, we always get more than
100 % which is reasonable in comparison to routing the same
amount of data by means of unicast transmissions.
In case of the rateless scenarios, we count the transmission
rounds needed for transmission of one generation to all re-
ceivers r ∈ R and divide this number by the generation size
h. In the first place, this seems to be a different definition,
but we have to consider that it is necessary to average the
transmission efficiencies for a large number of repetitions to
get meaningful results. For example, we get the same packet
transmission efficiency if either all messages are decodable
by all receivers every second generation in CryptoSNC or all
messages are decodable after two rounds for CryptoRSNC.
Another possibility to describe the data sent by the sender
is to refer to the payload of the data packets. This approach
allows for a fairer comparison of different algorithms for
CryptoSNC and CodingSNC since their communication over-
head may be rather divergent. If we relate the efficiency to
the payload, we have to define the packet size and the field
size q as further parameters for the simulation. For a fixed
packet size, we can estimate the payload per packet of a
certain SNC scheme in dependency on the generation size and
on the communication overhead of that scheme according to
[14]. Multiplying the payload r with the packet transmission
efficiency Ep yields the data transmission efficiency Ed:
Ed = Ep ∗ r. (4)
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
A. CodingSNC vs. CryptoSNC
For first experiments, we used the fully meshed network
(Sec. II) with k = 3, η = ` = 4 and an outside attacker who
can corrupt links with a probability p = 0.1. For the given
network, there are 32 links between the 3 levels that can be
corrupted. Hence, there are 3.2 corrupted links on average in
the given network. Since that network has a multicast capacity
of C = 4, h can be at maximum 4, too. Consequently, there
are four different settings for the simulations.
We measured the rank of the received (valid) packets rk(Y )
or the rank of all received packets minus the rank of the syn-
drome matrix rk(Y )−rk(S), respectively, for 1000 repetitions.
Hence, we derived the probability that Y is decodable for all
possible values of z.
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Fig. 2. Transmission efficiency Ep for p = 0.1
CodingSNC performs generally worse than CryptoSNC
(Fig. 2). Only in case of z = 3, decoding was possible with
both approaches with nearly 100 % probability. CrytoSNC
performs best with z = 1 (Ep = 236.7%) wheras CodingSNC
has the best efficiency with 2 redundant messages per gener-
ation (Ep = 129%).
The main problem of these approaches is the required a
priori knowledge about the attacker strength which will not
be available in practice. In case of a stronger attacker, the
probability that at least one receiver cannot decode signifi-
cantly increases. Hence, keeping the data until enough linearly
independent data packets arrived is much better for practical
use than retransmission of the whole generation. In the next
section, we evaluate the benefit of such a rateless scenario in
comparison to the predetermined redundancy.
B. Predetermined Redundancy vs. Rateless SNC
We used again the fully meshed network topology with
k = 3, η = ` = 4, and p = 0.1. For a generation size of h = 4
and 1000 repetitions, the decoding probability for all receivers
with CryptoRSNC was 18.7 % after the first transmission
round, 81.1 % after the second round and 0.2 % after a third
one. Thus, Ep = 18.7%∗ 41+81.1%∗ 42+0.2%∗ 43 = 237, 3%
which is comparable to Ep = 236.7% for CryptoSNC with
z = 1. For CodingRSNC, we got Ep = 184.7% for h = 4,
which is significant higher than Ep = 129% for CodingSNC
with z = 2, but still notably smaller than CryptoSNC.
However, rateless SNC allows for an arbitrary choice of the
generation size in order to possibly increase efficiency. Results
for different generation sizes are presented in Fig. 3.
For 4 ≤ h ≤ 40, the efficiency Ep monotonically increases
up to 331.3 % (CryptoRSNC) and 224.5 % (CodingRSNC).
Thus, we can state that the difference between CryptoSNC and
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Fig. 3. Transmission efficiency Ep of rateless SNC for different generation
sizes. The light baselines indicate Ep for predetermined redundancy.
CodingSNC persists also for rateless SNC. Furthermore, Cod-
ingRSNC seems to reach the efficiency level of CryptoSNC
for large h, but this will depend on the network topology.
C. Data Transmission Efficiency
As expected, a larger generation size implies higher effi-
ciency for both approaches. However, the increase of efficiency
is not linear and not boundless. Additionally, delay and pro-
cessing time increase and there are also a higher computational
effort, memory requirements, etc. Finally, a higher generation
size also implies an increase of the GEV which decreases the
payload per packet if we assume a limited packet size.
To substantiate these assumptions, we analyzed a network
with η = 2, k = 3, ` = 4 (Fig. 1) and measured Ep and the
time t needed for computing (Fig. 4).
Of course, these diagrams depend on the network topology;
however, they visualize that the increase in time t grows faster
than linear, whereas the increase in transmission efficiency Ep
decelerates and converges to a horizontal asymptote. Conse-
quently, a suitable value of h has to be defined as a trade-off
between Ep and other parameters like the time t.
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Fig. 4. Correlation of generation size to time and transmission efficiency.
To address the implications of an increased generation size
on the communication overhead, we evaluated Ed for a fixed
packet size of 1400 bytes. Since the payload depends on the
SNC scheme, we have to consider concrete algorithms for
computing Ed. Based on former evaluations, we picked 4
CryptoRSNC schemes as example (description of schemes in
[15]). According to (4), Ed was computed by multiplying the
payload r (taken from [15]) with Ep. Thus, the computed
values are not based on a simulation and some deviations may
occur, but they should give a usable approximation (Fig. 5).
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Fig. 5. Data transmission efficiency Ed of RatelessSNC with regard to
payload per packet for different generation sizes.
The curve denoted as raw corresponds to Ep. Since Ep
does not consider the actual payload per packet, this value is
generally larger than Ed. The selected CryptoRSNC schemes
are based on Practical Network Coding (PNC, [9]), i.e., each
packet contains a GEV with h coefficients. Hence, there
is a payload of 1400 − h bytes for PNC. The maximum
efficiency can be achieved for h ≈ 40. Regardless of the
actual efficiency value for the CryptoRSNC schemes, we can
assert that all these schemes have a maximum value of Ed for
h < 40, because the overhead of PNC is a lower bound for all
CryptoRSNC. Maximum values for Ed can be achieved for
DART [5] at h ≈ 25, for the RSA-based scheme RSA [2] at
h ≈ 16, for HMAC [3] at h ≈ 8, and for HH [4] at h ≈ 2. The
decreased efficiency is caused by additional data to be sent as
well as by the necessity to increase the field size for some of
the schemes.
In this evaluation, the RSA-based scheme would yield best
efficiency. However, we want to point out that Ed depends on
the topology itself [15]. The key aspect is, that there always
exists an optimal generation size h for a given network.
V. CONCLUSION
Within the experiments presented in this paper, we com-
pared CodingSNC and CryptoSNC to give some answers to
the question which approach should be preferred to strengthen
network coding schemes against pollution attacks regarding
efficiency. There are various factors that have to be consid-
ered; we worked with a basic network topology, a varying
generation size, and an outside attacker. For a comparison of
the approaches, we evaluated the transmission efficiency.
Just considering the overhead caused by the approaches,
CodingSNC seems to be preferable since there is no need
to transfer secret information to forwarding nodes, and there
is no computational overhead for the forwarders. CryptoSNC
requires additional overhead for key management, but Cod-
ingSNC also necessitates a secret channel or a shared secret.
However, CryptoSNC outperforms CodingSNC if we as-
sume an outside attacker who can control links with a certain
probability. To conclude, CodingSNC will maximally perform
as good as CryptoSNC, but mostly worse than CryptoSNC.
Thus, CryptoSNC should be preferred if possible.
Furthermore, our experiments delivered concrete results
regarding the question to which degree a larger generation
size improves efficiency for rateless SNC. Nevertheless, we
want to point out that the increase of efficiency is limited.
The higher the generation size, the lower the gain in efficiency.
Simultaneously, increasing the generation size causes a rapid
increment of grow for delay and required computing time.
Taking into account the data transmission efficiency Ed, best
results were achieved for manageable generation sizes h < 40
given a fixed packet size of 1400 bytes.
Future work is necessary to study the influence of additional
attacker models including also inside attackers. Further, we
will also investigate other network topologies in order to find
the best suited SNC scheme as well as best suited settings
for parameters like the generation size h. Thereby, we also
have to consider other performance metrics in addition to
the transmission efficiency. Finally, we are working on the
question how to design the network flow to minimize the
impact of an attacker.
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